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THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT: A CRITIQUE OF THE
AEROSPA TIALE DECISION
GEORGE

A.

BERMANN*

With its decision in Soci6ti Nationale IndustrielleAerospatiale v. United States DistrictCourt,1 the United States Supreme
Court resolved what had been widely regarded as "one of the
most difficult and important issues in international civil litigation in United States courts." 2 This opportunity arose out of the
divergence of views among American courts on the proper way
to reconcile the need for full disclosure of evidence with respect
for the sensitivities of foreign states where that evidence might
be located. The case before the Supreme Court, like many lower
court cases, dealt specifically with the impact of the Hague Evidence Convention 3 on the resolution of this tension. As formulated at the outset of Justice Stevens' majority opinion, the
question was whether and to what extent a federal court must
resort to the procedures set out in the Convention when litigants
seek discovery of information located abroad from a party over
whom the court has personal jurisdiction.
The underlying issues in Aerospatiale and similar Hague
Convention cases have aroused strong reactions among the bar
both here and abroad,4 among governments, 5 and even among
distinct departments of our own government. 6 The issues freely
* Professor of Law, Columbia University; Eason-Weinmann Visiting Professor of
Comparative Law, Tulane University; B.A. 1967, J.D. 1971, Yale University; LL.M. 1975,
Columbia University.
1. 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
2. Maier, ExtraterritorialDiscovery: Cooperation, Coercion and the Hague Evidence
Convention, 19 VAND. . TRANSNAT'L L. 239, 240 (1986).
3. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847
U.N.T.S. 231, reproduced (with declarations by the contracting states) in 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1781 (West Supp. 1988) [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention].
4. The range of views is well illustrated by the various contributions to a special law
review issue devoted to extraterritorial discovery. Compelling Discovery in Transnational
Litigation Symposium, 16 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. & POL. 957 (1984).
5. Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural Systems:
Germany and the United States, 34 AM. . COMP. L. 745, 779-81 (1986).
6. For an account of interagency differences of view, see Maier, supra note 2, at 241,
248-51; see also Comment, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
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straddle any frontier one might hope to trace between public and
private international law, between comparative and international
law, between law and politics, or between theory and practice.7
Although the Adrospatiale case accordingly offered the Supreme
Court the opportunity to make an important contribution in
these domains, the Court's decision itself must be counted a
disappointment.
The case arose out of the August 1980 crash in Iowa of a
Rallye plane. The plane was designed, manufactured, and marketed by the Socie6t Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale (an
entity wholly owned by the government of France) and its
wholly-owned French subsidiary, Societe de Construction
d'Avions de Tourisme. Suit was brought in an Iowa federal
court by the pilot who was injured in the crash, and by an
injured passenger and his wife, on grounds of negligence and
breach of warranty arising out of the manufacture and sale of a
defective plane.
Uncharacteristically for transnational litigation, the defendants did not question the personal jurisdiction of the district
court over them, doubtless due to the extensive advertising and
marketing of Rallye planes in the United States. However, a
characteristic discovery impasse arose when the plaintiffs sought
the production of certain documents under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 34, answers to interrogatories under Rule 33, and
admissions under Rule 36. The defendant companies claimed
that discovery would necessarily occur in France 8 and therefore
required exclusive resort to the procedures of the Convention, an
agreement to which both France and the United States are parties. In moving for a protective order, the defendants argued
that the Convention had mandatory application not only by its
own terms, but also by virtue of a 1980 French blocking statute
incorporated into the French Penal Code. This blocking statute
provided that, subject to existing treaties and international
agreements, no one may disclose documents of an "economic,
commercial, industrial, financial or technical nature intended to
Civil or Commercial Matters: The Exclusive and Mandatory Proceduresfor Discovery
Abroad, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1461, 1479-80 (1984).
7. The Supreme Court's still fresh and thus far largely uncommented opinion is just
the sort of material that would have excited my teacher, colleague, and friend Henry
deVries, in whose memory we gather, and elicited from him the insightful and far-ranging
commentary for which he is known.
8. The defendants emphasized not only the apparent locus of discovery abroad, but
also their own status as French corporations.
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serve as evidence in foreign judicial or administrative
proceedings. ' 9
The Convention itself provides several means for gathering
evidence in one contracting state for use in another state. First,
the Convention provides for letters of request (or letters rogatory) addressed by the court of the requesting state to a central
authority designated by the requested state with a view to procuring documents, deposing witnesses, or otherwise obtaining
information, and in principle subject to the same forms of compulsion that are customary in the latter state. Second, the Convention provides for commissions issued by the court to consular
officers of the requesting state, or to persons specially appointed
by the court, to take evidence in a foreign state, generally without compulsory process. Subject to certain limitations, the Convention requires signatory states to execute proper letters of
request and to observe the procedures specified by the requesting
court. At the same time, states are free upon signing the Convention to decline to permit execution of commissions in their
territories, or to make their consent to that practice subject to
certain conditions. This option reflects the view of some civillaw countries that commissions are basically more intrusive of
judicial sovereignty than are the conventional letters of request.
The defendants' motion in Adrospatiale for a protective
order against the allegedly extraterritorial discovery did not
meet with success. The magistrate to whom the cases had been
referred ruled that the Convention could not be allowed to displace the normal operation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on discovery.10 According to the magistrate, the special
interest of American courts in ensuring the full and proper litigation of products liability cases involving personal injury prevailed over the argument that complying with the discovery
request would necessarily entail violating French penal law. The
special interest of American courts prevailed because France's
motivation in enacting the law was to impede antitrust law
enforcement in American courts, because production might be
regarded as taking place other than in France, and because com9. Law of July 16, 1980 (Concerning the Communication of Documents and
Information of an Economic, Commercial or Technical Nature to Foreign Natural or
Legal Persons), 1980 Journal Officiel de la R6publique Frangaise [J.O.] 1799, art. lbis,
reprintedin 1987 French Law: Constitution and Selective Legislation (MB) 8-50.
10. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S.

Ct. 2542, 2547 (1987).
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pliance would not actually be particularly intrusive. Thus, even
with the penal implications in the balance, American interests in
compensating American products liability victims were held to
outweigh French interests in averting intrusive foreign
discovery.
In an unusual exercise of appellate review of an interlocutory discovery order, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court ruling, but in considerably more sweeping terms. Rather
than engaging in a balancing test-even a modified one weighted
in favor of disclosure in the interest of American litigants-the
court declared the Convention wholly inapplicable to discovery
against parties over whom an American court has an independent basis of jurisdiction, even when the documents or information sought are physically located abroad.11 With the
Convention confined to evidence gathering against nonparties
over whom the court lacks personal jurisdiction, resort to the
federal rules became entirely proper. The only issue remaining
was whether production actually should be ordered in light of
the apparent dilemma in which French and American law
placed the defendants. The court held that the competing
national interests would have to be balanced in order to make
that determination 12 and that the lower court had properly
accomplished that task. 13 Concerning the sanctions, if any, that
should be imposed on the defendants should they ultimately
choose not to comply with a valid discovery order, the court
14
deemed any such judgment to be premature.
In reviewing the Eighth Circuit's decision, the Supreme
Court recognized that American courts had taken a variety of
positions on the exclusivity or nonexclusivity of the Convention.
It had considered for review no fewer than two other court of
appeals decisions on the matter that had adopted somewhat different reasoning than that of the Eighth Circuit. Although I
11. In re Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986),
vacated, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
12. For this purpose, the appeals court invoked a balancing test derived from section
40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which
considers not only the vital national interests of each state, but also the hardship on the
foreign party, the nationality of the party, and the extent to which discovery would take
place abroad. Iad at 126-27.
13. A relevant factor for the court was that the order only required the French
corporations to bring documents and information from France rather than have acts
performed by French judicial officials. Id at 124-25.
14. Id. at 127. A decision on sanctions would turn in part on the foreign party's good
faith in attempting to comply with the order. Id.
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believe the Supreme Court seriously erred on the merits, Justice
Stevens' majority opinion has the refreshing merit of plainly setting out and then criticizing the various positions that might tenably be taken on the proper relationship of the Federal Rules to
the Convention.
The first position advanced by the French defendants in
Aerospatiale was essentially that the Convention by its own
terms mandates that it be used to the exclusion of any otherwise
applicable discovery procedure whenever evidence that is
located abroad is sought for use in an American court. This
view had previously been embraced by a number of American
state courts.' 5 A second position would require that Convention
procedures be used initially, although not necessarily exclusively. In other words, litigants in American courts would not
have to consider themselves limited to the Convention when
seeking evidence, but they would be bound to use it first and, in
some situations, be content with what it yields. A third position
assumes that the Convention does not of its own force require
either the exclusive or prior use of its procedures, thus leaving
such use strictly optional as a matter of treaty law. Under this
view, however, general and overriding considerations of international comity nevertheless should lead courts to insist that litigants use the Convention before resorting to any other means. 16
The fourth position would continue to draw inspiration from
international comity, but in a much diluted way. According to
this view, comity does not mandate prior Convention use as a
general rule, but simply suggests that courts consider the interests of the foreign state involved, among other factors, in making
the discretionary decision whether to require prior17resort to the
Convention as the "appropriate" course of action.
15. E.g., Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186
Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. 1982); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123
Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Ct. App. 1981). However, these courts appear to
have been influenced by the supremacy of federal law, including treaty law, over state court
procedures.
The United States government espoused the exclusivity position in Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Falzon, 465 U.S. 1014
(1984) (No. 82-1888).
16. See, eg., S & S Screw Mach. Co. v. Cosa Corp., 647 F. Supp. 600, 616 (M.D.
Tenn. 1986); General Elec. Co. v. North Star Int'l, Inc., No. 83-C-0838 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21,
1984); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 61 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, No. 83-C-1928 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 1983).
17. This has been a prominent view among lower federal courts. See, eg., Compagnie
Francaise d'Assurance pour le Commerce Ext6rieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D.
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Quite clearly, the more extreme position actually taken by
the Eighth Circuit in Aerospatiale'8 was not among the interpretations the Court thought tenable. Both the majority and separate opinions of the Supreme Court squarely rule out any notion
that application of the Convention might be confined to situations in which evidence is sought from persons not before the
court and not otherwise subject to the court's jurisdiction. The
Court properly rejected this limitation of the Convention to evidence gathering from third parties, as opposed to the litigants
themselves, as simply too drastic a narrowing of the treaty's
scope. The Court could not accept this narrow interpretation in
the absence of specific indications in the text or history of the
Convention that such was its intent. 19 In rejecting this view, the
Court fortunately averted what might have been an extremely
serious error in judgment.
Among the four options, the Court unanimously rejected
both the pure and the modified "mandatory" reading of the
16, 35-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Cooper Indus. v. British Aerospace, 102 F.R.D. 918, 919-20
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 523-24 (N.D. Ill. 1984);
Lasky v. Continental Prods. Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Judging by
its recent amicus curiae interventions, the United States Government similarly had come to
this view. Brief for the United States and the Securities Exchange Comm'n as Amici
Curiae at 7-13, Airospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695); Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Authority, 107
S. Ct. 3223 (1987) (No. 85-98) & Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm v. Walker, 107 S. Ct. 3223
(1987) (No. 85-99); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Club M6ditrrran6e,
S.A. v. Dorin, 469 U.S. 913 (1984) (No. 83-461), dismissing appealfrom 93 A.D.2d 1007,
462 N.Y.S.2d 524 (App. Div. 1983).
18. Airospatiale,782 F.2d at 124. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Accord
In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted,
475 U.S. 1118 (1986), cert. vacated, 476 U.S. 1168 (1986), judgment vacated and case
remanded, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987); In re Anschuetz & Co. GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 615 (5th
Cir. 1985), judgment vacated and case remanded, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987).
19. In this connection, the Court also rejected the attempts of certain parties and
lower federal courts to confine the scope of the Convention to discovery that could only be
conducted in the foreign state, and therefore to exclude from the Convention's reach
evidence that actually could be brought from abroad to the court and "produced" in the
United States, for example, in the form of documents or the appearance of witnesses. For
earlier cases advancing that view, see Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways, 103
F.R.D. 42 (D.D.C. 1984); Graco v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Ill. 1984);
Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360 (D. Vt. 1984); Lasky v.
Continental Prods. Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The Eighth Circuit in
Airospatialeheld that discovery does not take place within a state's borders merely because
documents to be produced somewhere else are located there. Airospatiale,782 F.2d at 124.
In the Fifth Circuit's leading cases, Anschuetz and Messerschmitt, the Court indicated that
orders directed to parties to produce evidence in an American forum do not require the
parties to do anything in the situs country, do not require any governmental action to take
place abroad, and therefore do not seriously infringe foreign sovereignty.
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Convention, and held that the Convention does not require
resort to its procedures for discovery directed to parties before
the court. Although the Court reached a reasonable conclusion
regarding these two options, it nevertheless advanced some
embarrassingly weak arguments in support. First, it contrasted
the preamble to the Evidence Convention with that of the earlier
Hague Service Convention, which was characterized as containing "mandatory language." The Service Convention stated:
"The present Convention shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or
extrajudicial document for service abroad." 2 There is good reason to doubt that even the quoted language of the Service Convention amounts to a requirement of exclusive or mandatory
prior use. It reads more plausibly as a simple statement of the
field to which the Convention applies, that is, as a statement of
scope. True, the Evidence Convention-whose preamble identifies a purpose merely to "facilitate" use of letters of request, to
"further" the accommodation of different national procedures,
and to "improve" international cooperation in evidence gathering 2 1-lacks even this slender linguistic basis for being read as
somehow. mandatory in application.22 The contrast, however, is
not significant.
Similarly, the Court reads too much into the use of the term
"may" in the Evidence Convention. The term "may" is used in
connection with the chapter on letters of request (a judicial
authority "may" forward a letter of request) and on evidence
taking by diplomatic officers, consular agents, and commissioners (persons who "may" take evidence under stated conditions).
Essentially the Court would have us read the permissive "may"
as negating the Convention's exclusive character. But even if the
Convention procedures were truly mandatory, the term "may"
would still be used to indicate what courts and officers of signatory states are permitted to do, or request be done, with respect
to evidence located in other signatory states. Clearly, the word
"may" should not have been as strenuously pressed into service
in support of the Court's reading as it was. A fairer conclusion
20. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-judicial
Documents, Nov. 15, 1965, art. 1, 20 U.S.T. 361, 362, T.I.A.S. No. 6638.
21. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, preamble, 23 U.S.T. at 2557.
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 473 comment b (1987) flatly declares, "Nothing in the Convention expressly obligates
courts of a contracting state to resort to Convention procedures as the exclusive means to

obtain evidence abroad."
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is that it does not markedly strengthen anyone's case, including,
I readily concede, the proponents of exclusivity.
A second and even shakier argument by the Court draws
upon article 27 of the Convention, which provides that contracting states may continue to use more liberal methods of rendering evidence than those expressly authorized by the
Convention.23 The argument is that such language permits a
contracting state, at its pleasure, to use or not to use Convention
procedures. 24 The terms of article 27 alone, however, plainly
show that this provision makes the Convention nonexclusive in
an altogether different sense from that argued by the Adrospatiale defendants. Under article 27, a state may place its courts
more broadly at the service of foreign tribunals and show themselves more hospitable to the taking of evidence on their territory in aid of foreign litigation than the Convention itself
requires. In other words, the Convention sets only a minimum
standard of international cooperation. Article 27 simply does
not address the question whether signatory states may impose on
foreign states and foreign parties in ways other than those that
the Convention expressly mentions and as to which it ensures
cooperation. If anything, article 27 seems to carry a negative
implication, for while it invites states to be more compliant than
the Convention requires, it does not invite them to be more
demanding.25 For an advocate to marshal an argument based on
article 27 in support of the nonexclusivity thesis is understandable; for the Supreme Court to rely upon it, however, is not.
The Court's third argument, and its only convincing one,
was that treating the Convention as the exclusive framework for
international discovery among signatory states would have very
far-reaching and improbable consequences, certainly from the
American point of view. For example, the Convention leaves
signatory states free to declare that they will not execute any
23. Article 27 provides that the Convention's provisions do not prevent a Contracting
State from:
(a) declaring that Letters of Request may be transmitted to its judicial
authorities through channels other than those provided for in Article 2;
(b) permitting, by internal law or practice, any act provided for in this
Convention to be performed upon less restrictive conditions;
(c) permitting, by internal law or practice, methods of taking evidence other
than those provided for in this Convention.
Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, 23 U.S.T. at 2569.
24. For prior cases supporting this view, see supra note 17.
25. The Adrospatiale majority was nevertheless "unpersuaded" that any such negative
inference could be drawn. Airospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2552-53 n.24.
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letter of request in aid of common-law pretrial discovery of documents.26 If the Convention were indeed exclusive, then to the
extent such declarations are made, the United States would
appear to have forsworn access by its courts and litigants to that
kind of foreign discovery. The improbability of this result
strongly counsels against giving the Convention the mandatory
effect argued for by foreign interests and governments.
Moreover, whatever the assumptions of the other signatory
states may have been,28 the United States showed very little evidence of an actual intent that Convention procedures should displace the standard practices of extraterritorial discovery
customarily permitted by American courts. 29 The Senate Report
simply characterizes the Convention as setting up a system to
overcome certain difficulties encountered in obtaining evidence
abroad, and thereby help secure evidence in a form that is both
useful to the requesting state and acceptable to the state executing the request.3 0 According to a leading member of the United
States delegation to the Hague Conference, the Convention
"makes no major changes in United States procedure and
requires no major changes in United States legislation or rules,"
even though it does provide certain internationally agreed-upon
26. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, art. 23, 23 U.S.T. at 2568. Article 23
permits contracting states to declare that they will "not execute Letters of Request issued
for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law
countries." It cannot, however, be invoked to preclude pretrial examination of witnesses.
27. Sixteen of the Convention's twenty signatory states have issued such a
declaration. See 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY pt. VII, at 15-19 (1988).
28. The German courts, for example, appear to have assumed that the Convention
was intended, as a later and more special enactment, to take precedence over any
conflicting or different provisions of German procedural law. Judgment of Nov. 27, 1980,
Oberlandesgericht, Munich, 1981 Juristenzeitung [JZ] 538, 541, and Judgment of June 10,
1981, Landgericht, Munich, 1982 Zeitschrift Fur Zivilprozess [ZZP] 362, 363, discussed in
Heck, U.S. Misinterpretation of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 231, 246-47 (1986).

29. Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining
Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV.
733, 760 (1983). But see Heck, supra note 28, at 255-57 (taking the view that even under
American law the Convention can properly only be viewed as constituting the exclusive
legal regime for extraterritorial production in signatory states and, in that sense only, a
complement to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
30. S. EXEC. REP. No. 25, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972). Similarly, the Report of the
United States Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, 8 I.L.M. 785, 806-08 (1969), describes the Convention as designed to
ease the burden on litigants in procuring evidence located abroad, and to yield discovery
"tolerable" to the requested state and "utilizable" by the requesting state; see also Amram,
The ProposedConvention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A. J. 651 (1969).
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procedures for international discovery.31 Regarding the issue of
exclusivity, the legislative history is unclear. Apart from
describing letters of request as "a principal means of obtaining
evidence abroad," the Senate Report merely restates the import
of article 27, namely that the Convention "[p]reserve[s] all more
favorable and less restrictive practices arising from internal
law."'3 2 Similarly, the Report of the United States Delegation to
the Hague Conference that prepared the Evidence Convention
confines itself to observing that, while the text "provides a substantial number of improvements over existing practice, it is...
designed to set minimum standards for international assistance."33 All in all, the evidence that the United States positively
committed itself to using Convention procedures alone for
obtaining evidence located within the territory of other signatory
states is quite meager.
The French defendants in Adrospatiale, as well as commentators writing in support of their position, urged that unless the
signatory states intended Convention procedures to be followed
exclusively, most of those states would have had no incentive to
enter into the Convention. Because the United States had
already liberalized its practices on international cooperation in
evidence gathering, largely on a unilateral basis, 4 its European
treaty partners apparently stood to gain nothing from the Convention if it did not signify a commitment by the United States
to content itself with the procedures that the Convention specifically contemplates. In the absence of firmer support in the language and history of the Convention, this argument seems to be
the strongest one to support reading the Convention as embodying such a commitment, and it did apparently win a measure of
support from Justice Blackmun writing for the Adrospatiale
minority.
31. Amram, Explanatory Report on the Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, quoted in S. EXEC. REP. No. 25, supra note 30, at
5.
32. S.EXEC. REP. No. 25, supra note 30, at 1-2.
33. Report of the United States Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, 8 I.L.M. 785, 808 (1969) (emphasis in original);
see also Amram, supra note 30, at 655 ("What the convention has done is to provide a set of
minimum standards to which all countries may subscribe").
34. For a discussion of the 1964 amendments to Rule 28(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781 and 1782, see Amram, supra note 30, at 651-52.
35. Adrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2559 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Blackmun's opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and

O'Connor.
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For all its appeal, this approach to the Convention is nevertheless deeply flawed. First, the signatory states did not enter
into this treaty with United States relations alone in mind. They
stood to gain from normalizing their channels of international
judicial assistance with as many other states as possible. But
even regarding the United States, the liberalization of federal
procedures on international judicial assistance that occurred in
1964 had gone no further than to authorize federal courts, with
or without a showing of reciprocity by the requesting country, to
cooperate in the execution of foreign letters rogatory. Under the
liberalized procedures, the courts might still withhold their
cooperation. So far as extraterritorial discovery performed in
the United States is concerned, if the Convention only served to
elevate international judicial assistance from a discretionary to a
mandatory matter, it still had evident utility.
Ultimately, however, the argument rests not only on flawed
logic, but also on a deeply troubling premise about the proper
interpretation of international treaties. It may be fair and reasonable, though still questionable, for courts to read into private
agreements undertakings that the parties did not expressly make
when those undertakings seem plausible and even mildly probable, given the parties' assumed bargaining positions and apparent incentives. But it should not be considered excessively oldfashioned to restrain those impulses when the prerogatives of
sovereign states are involved. Quite apart from the serious separation of powers concerns that are raised by the expansive judicial interpretation of international engagements, the sound
working of treaty arrangements calls for a measure of reserve in
determining the extent to which states have engaged themselves
by treaty to abandon their traditional practices. 36 Powerful considerations such as these probably explain why the Supreme
Court was unanimous in rejecting the notion that the Convention by its own terms had become the exclusive means for
obtaining discovery in signatory countries in aid of American
litigation. In truth, the Court would have done well to rest its
case on arguments of this sort and to resist the other intellectually flimsy arguments that advocates of the unbridled use of the
Federal Rules had advanced.
36. Justice Stevens aptly quoted his own dissenting opinion in Trans World Airlines
v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 262 (1984), for the position that international
agreements should be read with a view to delineating with care the common ground upon

which state parties have come to agreement. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2552 n.23.
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The heart of my difficulty with the Adrospatiale decision,
therefore, does not lie in the Court's refusal to treat the Convention as displacing the ordinarily applicable procedures or as
requiring by its own terms prior resort to Convention procedures. It lies rather in the Court's rejection of what it identified
as the third option, namely requiring prior resort to Convention
procedures as a general rule in furtherance of traditional comity
considerations. That solution had won favor not only among
academic writers,37 but also among the lower federal courts.38
And in the end, it persuaded four members of the Court.39
A rule of prior resort does present the advantage of injecting a measure of certainty into an otherwise unguided exercise of
discretion. Relying on comity to develop strong presumptions in
international legal relations is, as the minority opinion notes, an
established practice, whether in choice of forum, 4° choice of
law, 4 1 sovereign immunity, 42 or other matters not mentioned in

the opinion.43 Each of these areas is now marked by a general
rule chosen because it tends most to promote a cooperative international regime. 44 There is no reason to suppose that the Convention could not serve as a useful signpost in the same direction
so far as extraterritorial discovery is concerned.
A comity-driven rule of prior resort is not of course without
its difficulties. One such difficulty lies in determining the cir37. E.g., Oxman, supra note 29, at 761; Maier, supra note 2, at 255-60.
38. Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 61 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik und Eisengieberei mbH v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d
492, 504-06 (W. Va. 1985); Vincent v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 193 N.J. Super.
716, 723,475 A.2d 686, 690 (App. Div. 1984); Th. Goldschmidt A.G. v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d
443, 445 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal.
App. 3d 238, 247, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876, 882-83 (Ct. App. 1982); Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 857-59, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874,
885-86 (Ct. App. 1981); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.
App. 3d 503, 507-09, 109 Cal. Rptr. 219, 220-21 (Ct. App. 1973). A comity-based solution
did not, however, appeal to the 'court of appeals in the Adrospatiale case. This court
believed that for an American court to demand discovery after a foreign court had refused
it under the Convention would, if anything, exacerbate international relations.
Airospatiale,782 F.2d at 125-26.
39. See supra note 35; Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2557 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
40. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-19 (1974); The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1972).
41. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577-82 (1953).
42. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
626-27 (1983).

43. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (recognition of foreign judgments).
44. See Maier, supra note 2, at 253.
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cumstances under which a party may be excused from application of the general rule, or under which a party who is
disappointed with the result of an initial Convention-based
request may then proceed to non-Convention alternatives. No
single formula possibly can provide a solution to all cases that
might raise one or both of these questions. According to Justice
Blackmun, whose separate opinion advocates a rule of prior
Convention resort, such a rule can legitimately be avoided
"when it appears that it would be futile to employ the Convention or when its procedures prove to be unhelpful. '4 5 This test is
necessarily uncertain in application. Moreover, even if it is met,
a party seeking non-Convention discovery probably must present "[a]n individualized analysis of the circumstances of [the]
particular case" in hopes of establishing that such further discovery on balance is warranted.46
Although these difficulties are considerable, they are not
insurmountable.47 They are much less severe in my judgment
than those that would result from giving the Convention no particular weight at all from a comity point of view, or from assuming that resort to the Convention probably would yield little, if
any, evidence of value. A final consideration is that Convention
procedures may actually work in some cases, in the sense that
they do satisfy the requesting party and thereby obviate the need
to engage in an essentially unstructured balancing of interests to
decide whether additional non-Convention discovery is appropriate. Even if the procedures do not fully satisfy the requesting
party, they may produce enough material to focus the conflict on
a more limited and ultimately more manageable body of evidence. In this way, the Convention would help clarify the basis
for the foreign state's unwillingness to cooperate and thereby
point the way to some accommodation.48
Notwithstanding the powerful policy arguments for a comity-based presumption of prior Convention use, a majority of the
45. Adrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2558 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Conceivably, resort to the Convention would be considered fruitless if the
evidence sought were documentary and were located in a state making an article 23
declaration. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 473 comment i (1987).
46. Adrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2558.
47. For thoughtful suggestions on how a court might go about making these
assessments, see Oxman, supra note 29, at 784-85.
48. See generally id. at 782 (cautioning against speculation on whether a requested
state will withhold cooperation).
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Supreme Court in Agrospatiale rejected this solution as purely
and simply "unwise." In reaching its conclusion, the Court
cited several factors: (1) a supposed delay and expense associated with Convention procedures, (2) an assumption that resort
to those procedures will prove unavailing in any event, and (3)
an unsupported and palpably wrong insistence that international
comity can operate only on a strict case by case basis rather than
through presumptions of general application. As the majority
stated, "We do not articulate specific rules to guide this delicate
task of adjudication. ' 49 For these reasons, the Court concluded
that the Convention, when applicable, only represents an option
for litigants and courts-an option which they should exercise as
and when a Restatement of Foreign Relations-style balancing
analysis so suggests. This balancing will turn on the "respective
interests of the foreign nation and the requesting nation, ' 50 the
importance of and need for the information sought and its availability through other channels, the specificity of the demand, the
likelihood that resort to Convention procedures will prove effective, and the intrusiveness of the particular discovery
requested."
Admittedly, one can easily exaggerate the distance between
the majority and minority positions in Adrospatiale. For its part,
the majority is not wholly insensitive to the special considerations governing transnational litigation. Although it ultimately
left the matter to the discretion of the lower courts, the majority
admonished those courts to demonstrate "special vigilance to
49. Adrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2557.
50. Id. at 2555. See generally Griffin, Proceduresfor Civil Discovery Outside the
United States After Adrospatiale, 15 INT'L Bus. LAW. 350 (1987). For a characterization of
the test as essentially a "comparative impairment" analysis, see Note, The Interplay
Between the Discovery Provisionsof the HagueEvidence Convention and the FederalRules of
Civil Procedure: Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale, 9 Hous. J. INT'L L. 333
(1987).
51. In a footnote, the majority refers to the five factors mentioned in § 437(1)(c) of
the then latest draft revision (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1986) of the RESTATEMENT OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES as "relevant to any comity analysis."
Adrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2555-56 n.28. These factors are:
(1) the importance to the.., litigation of the documents or other information
requested;

(2) the degree of specificity of the request;
(3) whether the information originated in the United States;
(4) the availability of alternative means of securing the information; and
(5) the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would
undermine important interests of the state where the information is located.
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protect foreign litigants from the danger that unnecessary or
unduly burdensome discovery may place them in a disadvantageous position."' 52 Trial judges "must supervise pretrial proceedings particularly closely to prevent discovery abuses. ' 53 The
objections voiced by foreign litigants deserve "the most careful
consideration," and in giving them that consideration courts
must "take care to demonstrate due respect for any special problem confronted by the foreign litigant on account of its nationality or the location of its operations, and for any sovereign
interest expressed by [the] foreign state."' 54 All in all, lower
courts presumably should take seriously the claims of foreign
parties that bypassing the Convention would subject them to
intrusive or otherwise unreasonable evidence gathering. Conversely, the minority in Adrospatiale cannot be described as categorical in its views either. Significantly, it would subject the
presumption of prior resort to the Convention to a proviso
allowing for the Convention to be bypassed in cases in which its
procedures are bound to prove inadequate for the production of
necessary evidence. Thus, all the Justices acknowledged in some
way the importance of international comity and its potential
advancement through resort to the Convention. None of the
Justices would impose the Convention's mechanism regardless
of all else. Where they divide is over the comparative advantages of a general rule favoring the Convention, on one hand,
and the more usual case-by-case approach to the conduct and
supervision of discovery practice, on the other. 5
While fully acknowledging the common ground shared by
all members of the Court, I believe that the majority chose the
wrong course. First, the majority's position unnecessarily
reduces the Convention to modest legal significance. Second, it
leaves the lower courts without meaningful guidance about when
and where the Convention deserves priority and under what circumstances, once it has been invoked, its proven inadequacies
justify subsequent resort to traditional evidence-gathering methods. Finally, the Court belittles the Convention through what
can be described without exaggeration as ridicule and caricature.
My reasons for making these three claims follow.
52. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2557.
53. Id.
54. Id
55. See generally Alley & Platto, U.S. Supreme Court EstablishesRules for Discovery
of Foreign Parties: The Adrospatiale Case, 15 INT'L Bus. LAw. 353, 355 (1987).
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First, the Court has severely deprived the Convention of
practical effect, even though a less drastic alternative presented
itself. The majority's devotion to pure ad hoe balancing would
be more appropriate if the United States had never entered into
an international cooperation regime such as the Convention.
Under such circumstances, it would be entirely proper for district courts to inquire into
the importance to the. . litigation of the documents or other
information requested; the degree of specificity of the request;
whether the information originated in the United States; the
availability of alternative means of securing the information;
[or] the extent to which non-compliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the United States, or
compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the state where the information is located. 6
A wholly open-ended and discretionary response to the interests
of foreign states in regulating the disclosure of information
within their territory seems unsatisfactory, however, in light of
the Convention's fundamental purpose of easing international
tensions oer the extraterritorial production of evidence.
Admittedly the Convention should not be transformed into the
exclusive vehicle for international evidence taking on the mere
ground that many or even a majority of the European signatory
states imagined they had entered into such an agreement when
they in fact did not. Nevertheless, the Convention does represent important and valuable concessions on the part of these
nations. The most notable concessions are the commitment to
allow evidence taking by diplomatic or consular officers and by
commissioners appointed by the foreign court, and to follow the
procedures that a foreign court specifically requests.57 Again,
these concessions cannot by their own force convert the Conven56. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES
(Revised) § 437(1)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986), cited approvingly by the majority. See
supra note 51 and accompanying text.
57. According to sources relied upon by Justice Blackmun, evidence taking abroad by
American diplomatic or consular officials and by commissioners named by American
courts greatly exceeds in frequency the use abroad of foreign letters rogatory or letters of
request. Airospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2564 n.16 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Hague Convention signatory states also have agreed to use, and under
most circumstances compel, procedures of proof-discovery of third parties, administering
of oaths, preparation of verbatim transcripts, attorney examination and crossexamination-that are different from and generally more onerous than their own
customary procedures. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, arts. 3, 9, & 10, 23
U.S.T. at 2558-62.
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tion into something that it is not. But they can powerfully influence American courts, out of comity, to make prior resort to the
Convention a presumptive obligation of those litigants seeking to
perform discovery abroad in a contracting state, at least whenever it is probable that the foreign state would be offended by not
doing so. 58 That courts adopt such a practice as a matter of
sound judgment, rather than legal obligation, is of secondary
importance.
In this regard, international discovery impasses need to be
placed in a somewhat larger context. Recent years have produced conflicts between national legal orders over various
aspects of international litigation, including the assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction to prescribe, the deference owing to
mandatory rules of law of a nonforum state, the proper application of the forum non conveniens doctrine, and the authority of
one state to enjoin its nationals from litigating in the courts of
another state, among others. A mostly one-sided interpretation
of the Convention-under which Americans win access to foreign discovery under the Convention but accord it no particular
weight in deciding whether to permit foreign discovery to proceed as usual under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedureneither reflects nor promotes the spirit of accommodation that
can best defuse these multiple points of conflict. The arguments
for making prior resort to the Convention the normal and presumptive route to extraterritorial discovery are not weakened by
the other signatory states' failure to extract a specific concession
from the United States (for example, by inserting appropriately
mandatory language into the Convention). A rule of first resort
is simply a suitable way for the United States to demonstrate its
58. Professor Oxman, writing some years ago and upon a careful weighing of all the
considerations, reached much the same conclusion:
As a matter of the orderly administration of justice, when trial courts have
reasonable alternatives available under the Hague Evidence Convention or other
agreed procedures, it is undesirable to press either the international law or
constitutional law issues surrounding discovery abroad to definitive resolution, to
expose the courts to unseemly controversy and ridicule, or even to escalate the
controversy. The agreed procedures should be used. If the response of a foreign
court to a letter of request is satisfactory, or foreign permission is granted to a
United States consul or court-appointed commissioner to take evidence, the
problems are avoided. If all or part of a letter of request is not executed, the trial
court will be "informed immediately" and "advised of the reasons." It could
then, in light of its knowledge of the case and the communications received,
weigh the various factors [involved].
Oxman, supra note 29, at 795 (citations omitted).
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respect for foreign-country sensibilities, for orderly international
relations, and for a general spirit of international cooperation in
litigation.59
Second, the majority's legal reduction of the Convention
leaves lower courts, and therefore litigants, quite adrift in deciding what weight to assign the Convention in the overall assessments of reasonableness in discovery that Adrospatiale now
requires. In the absence of a presumption, very difficult and sensitive judgment calls necessarily will abound. 0 Whether this
will result, as Justice Blackmun fears, in a pro-forum bias is of
course speculative; but the risk is not one to which our courts
should be exposed, particularly given the availability of the Convention. With the inevitable increase in international litigation,
a routine reliance on courts to make these difficult assessments
case by case is not an attractive prospect. 61 Foreign states experience practical constraints in intervening to express their perceived interests in each piece of transnational litigation that
takes place in the United States. In addition, the limited scope
of appellate review of interlocutory discovery decisions will tend
both to retard the development of useful standards for making
these decisions and to render correction of error less likely.62
Most fundamentally though, individual adjudications in American courts are simply not an appropriate setting for balancing
the interests of foreign states against our own, or even for assessing the obviously important foreign policy implications of such
determinations.63
Finally, the Adrospatiale majority has given the Convention
a profile that is extremely unflattering and even caricatural, and
probably will only cause practitioners and lower courts to pay
less attention to it than they otherwise might. The caricature
lies first in a distorted picture of the basic Convention framework. According to the majority, treating the Convention as the
exclusive vehicle for extraterritorial discovery would "subject
59. Id. at 761.
60. See Leigh, Request for Discovery Abroad-Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 81 AM J. INT'L L. 944, 947 (1987).
61. See S & S Screw Machine Co. v. Cosa Corp., 647 F. Supp. 600, 618 (1986)
("international civil litigants might benefit from the formulation of standards more
reproducible in their application than the necessarily fact-laden comity inquiry").
62. See Alley & Platto, supra note 55, at 355.
63. This is especially the case in a comparative impairment analysis involving
national interests that are in irreconcilable conflict on the same point of public policy. See
Note, supra note 50, at 334-35, 350-51.
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every American court hearing a case involving a national of a
contracting State to the internal laws of that State.", That, of
course, wildly exaggerates the Convention's effect. Quite to the
contrary, the Convention seeks to ensure cooperation by all signatory states in a minimum set of mutually agreeable procedures, whatever the normal and usual practices of these states
under purely domestic law happen to be. The most obvious beneficiary of the Convention is, of course, the United States, which
previously could not demand that other countries lend assistance
to extraterritorial discovery in American litigation. Indeed, the
United States still cannot do so with respect to cases or countries
not covered by this or some other convention. 6 The Court's
characterization of the opportunity that article 23 gives signatory states to decline to execute letters of request for pretrial
documentary discovery as the right unilaterally to abrogate the
Convention's procedures 66 is likewise much exaggerated.
The opinion also conjures up a distorted picture, mercifully
relegated to a footnote, of the consequences of mandatory resort
to the Convention. Essentially, the argument is that treating
Convention procedures as exclusive would generate a number of
"unacceptable asymmetries." 67 The first asymmetry allegedly
discriminates unfairly within the framework of American litigation between a United States national and an opposing party
from another signatory state. The foreign party, the argument
goes, could take full advantage of the liberal domestic discovery
practices that prevail in the United States, while the American
party would have to content itself with whatever evidence its
resort to the Convention's exclusive procedures might yield.68
But this asymmetry is embarrassingly inapposite, because application of the Convention, whatever its interpretation, does not
turn on the nationality of the litigant, but rather on the site of
the evidence sought. Quite plausibly, the foreign litigant would
be the one prejudiced by the Convention's assumed deficiencies
64. Adrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2553. For a similar characterization of the Convention,

see Graco v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 522 (N.D. Ill.
1984).
65. See Heck, supra note 28, at 260.
66. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2552.

67. Id. at 2553-54 n.25.
68. The alleged discriminatory impact was apparently an important element in the
Fifth Circuit's determination that the Convention has no application to discovery from
parties, as opposed to third persons not within the court's jurisdiction. In re Anschuetz &
Co. GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1985),judgment vacated and case remanded, 107 S.
Ct. 3223 (1987).
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because the evidence it seeks is located abroad, either in its home
state or in a third contracting state, and the American litigant is
the one who, because the evidence it seeks is situated in the
United States, enjoys the liberality of domestic American discovery procedures. In any event, and as the Aerospatiale minority
also aptly observed, any injustice of this sort can be avoided by a
district court through the exercise of its express authority under
the Federal Rules to control discovery in the interest of fairness
to the parties.
The second cited asymmetry is even more perplexing.
According to this argument, foreign companies allegedly will
derive an unfair business advantage over their American counterparts when both parties are in an American court because the
foreign company may enjoy untrammeled discovery privileges
under usual American practices. The United States company,
on the other hand, may receive only the scraps that Convention
practices afford it. This argument, of course, suffers from the
same peculiar assumption that the evidence sought by each party
to a piece of international litigation is to be found in the place of
nationality of its adversary. However, the argument also seeks
to elevate what at most is a litigation advantage of one party to
an international suit over the other into a structural business
advantage of foreign firms over American ones. But just how
much weight does this factor honestly deserve in an obviously
much larger and vastly more complex picture of relative business advantages? And why continue, somewhat myopically, to
assume that transnational litigation necessarily will take place in
an American forum?
The third putative asymmetry truly should have been left
unmentioned. The argument suggests that American litigants
who square off in American court against nationals of foreign
signatory states will not be treated as well in their efforts at foreign discovery as those American litigants who face nationals of
foreign non-signatory states. This consequence is somehow supposed to be unfair, even though these two classes of Americans,
unlike the opposing litigants in the majority's first asymmetry
and the competing enterprises in its second, are in no meaningful
sense competing with one another. More importantly, one simply cannot complain that the Convention (under the exclusivity
hypothesis) would cause the nationals of foreign signatory states
to be treated differently in American litigation from nationals of
foreign nonsignatory states. This advantage is precisely the kind

1989]

HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION

545

that the signatory states might have negotiated and bargained
for under the Convention in exchange for the advantages
extended to foreign nationals wishing to obtain discovery
abroad. To dismiss the legitimately disparate effect on nationals
of signatory as against nonsignatory states as an "unacceptable
asymmetry," because the particular Americans against whom
they eventually litigate necessarily feel a correspondingly disparate impact, is to launch a truly unprecedented attack on the
basic mechanism of international treaties. Many international
agreements place nationals of signatory states in a privileged
position compared to the nationals of nonparty states. The disparate impact of those concessions on persons dealing with these
two classes of foreign nationals, far from being an anomaly, is
69
the intended and desired result.
What the Court basically overlooks in its search for disturbing inequities is the one overriding equity that the Convention arguably sought to achieve and, if interpreted as mandatory
and exclusive, probably would achieve: that courts of all signatory states could order the production of foreign evidence only
by following the same common evidence-gathering procedures.
This interpretation would effect precisely the sort of mutuality of
obligation among contracting states that international treaties
traditionally aim to secure. As I have already suggested, the
Convention states did not enter into an arrangement that of its
own force confined them to uniform procedures for obtaining
evidence abroad. But there would have been nothing anomalous
in doing so. Furthermore, assuming they have not done so,
American courts nevertheless could and should give the Convention preferred status as a matter of international comity.
Lastly, the majority denigrates the Convention procedures
themselves. Suggestions abound that the Convention is a recipe
for frustration. Once made exclusive, it allegedly would subject
American proceedings "to the actions or, equally, to the inactions of foreign judicial authorities. ' 70 "In many situations," the
opinion further warns, "the Letter of Request procedure authorized by the Convention would be unduly time consuming and
expensive, as well as less certain to produce needed evidence
69. The majority fails to mention that, although American litigants would lose their
rights to untrammeled direct discovery when their adversaries are nationals of Convention
states, those same American litigants would also derive the countervailing advantage of
protection against non-Convention attempts at foreign discovery by their opponents.
70. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2553.
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than direct use of the Federal Rules. ' 71 Even without questioning whether litigant-controlled discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure presents any advantage in these
respects, or examining the extent to which Convention alternatives to the letter of request procedure adequately compensate
for the latter's deficiencies, 72 a marginal preference for the usual
American procedures would not justify elevating them over
Convention procedures if comity is to be given serious consideration in this matter.
Leaving aside its unfortunate rhetoric, the Adrospatiale
majority was probably also influenced by certain unhappy prospects associated with treating Convention procedures as exclusive. Among such prospects was the possibility that foreign
states would make unprincipled use of the Convention's broad
national sovereignty or security exception,73 invoke an article 23
declaration to block a pretrial discovery request that in all material respects is quite reasonable, or simiply fail to perform clear
obligations of assistance under the Convention.
Had the Convention proved unfruitful over the years, that
would be sufficient reason to deny it any greater force or effect
than its terms require, whether in the name of comity or otherwise. But the Convention's record is positive. 74 The article 23
declarations filed by a large majority of contracting states,
declining to "execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose
of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries,"' 7 5 are a source of legitimate concern. Ini71. Id. at 2555. Other courts have volunteered similarly unflattering
characterizations of the Convention. See In re Anschuetz & Co. GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 606
(5th Cir. 1985),judgment vacated and case remanded, 107 S.Ct. 3223 (1987).
72. Concededly, only a few states have given general permission to consuls and
commissioners appointed by foreign courts to take evidence in their territories. Most states
are more restrictive, requiring that permission be sought in particular cases and
withholding measures of compulsion in such situations.
73. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, art. 12, 23 U.S.T. at 2562-63. This
exception was successfully invoked in a British court to avoid production of documents in

connection with American antitrust investigations into certain activities of British
companies outside the United States. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
1978 App. Cas. 547. Presumably, it also may come into play when a foreign blocking
statute is applicable, except to the extent that such a statute is expressly made subject to
international treaties or agreements such as the Hague Evidence Convention. See infra
note 82 and accompanying text.

74. See Report on the Work of the Special Commission on the Operation of the
Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, 17 I.L.M. 1425, 1431 (1978).
75. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 3, art. 23; see supra notes 26-27 and

accompanying text.
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tially, courts in the declaring states did tend categorically to
deny requests that they took to constitute common-law style
pretrial discovery.76 However, as Justice Blackmun's separate
opinion indicates, those states more recently have undertaken to
narrow substantially their view of "pre-trial discovery" within
the meaning of article 23. This result is largely due to the efforts
of Americans to dispel certain misconceptions about what such
discovery necessarily entails." To judge by the emerging pattern
of amended declarations, the declaring states, most notably the
United Kingdom whose efforts led to the exception in the first
place, now object primarily to documentary requests that are
overly generalized or that seek evidence which is irrelevant to
the case or otherwise unlikely to be used at trial. 8 In any event,
article 23 declarations pertain only to letters of request for documents, and not to the Convention's other procedures and forms
of discovery. Should it happen that a state's invocation of article
23 effectively blocks access to needed documents, the court will
face precisely the exceptional situation in which, under Justice
Blackmun's view, avoidance of the Convention might be
justified.
Another reason for not exaggerating the risk of impasse
under the Convention is that American courts have independent
reason to examine discovery demands closely for their overall
reasonableness whenever the evidence sought is located abroad.
The amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure call for a more
active role by trial judges in averting discovery abuse by private
litigants in all categories of cases,79 including those that entail
76. See, eg., Judgment of Oct. 31, 1980, Oberlandesgericht, Munich, 1981 JZ at 539.
77. According to the United States delegation to the Special Commission on the
Operation of the Evidence Convention, see supra note 74, at 143 1, civil-law representatives
entertained some serious misunderstandings about the nature of American pretrial
discovery, assuming, for example, that it was employed prior to institution of a suit to elicit
evidence that might provide the basis for bringing such a suit.
78. See, eg., Declaration of Denmark of July 23, 1980, 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL
LAW DIRECTORY pt. VII, at 16 (1988). The Danish declaration is typical of several that
confine their objections to requests that either fail to specify with particularity the
documents to be produced or call upon a person to state all the documents relevant to the
proceeding that are or were in his possession or custody. France recently has amended its
declaration so as not to cover "requested documents [that] are enumerated limitatively in
the Letter of Request and have a direct and precise link with the object of the procedure."
Amended Declaration of France, id. pt. VII, at 17.
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b), (g). Rule 26(b) specifically authorizes the court on its own
initiative to limit the scope of discovery to avoid discovery that may be duplicative,
needlessly burdensome, dilatory, or otherwise unreasonable or abusive. Rule 26(g)
authorizes the court to impose "an appropriate sanction" upon an attorney who, by signing
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the production of evidence abroad. The newly revised Restatement of Foreign Relations reinforces that expectation, particularly with respect to foreign discovery. The Restatement
conditions such discovery, even as against a party over whom
the court enjoys personal jurisdiction, on a court order whose
issuance in turn would depend on a specific showing of both relevancy and necessity.80 Thus, the prospects for convergence
between the views of our courts-and those of the relevant authorities in other Conventioi states are ample; they share a common
appreciation for relevance, specificity, and judicial supervision in
the discovery context. 81
"Blocking legislation" in a number of contracting states
represents the other potential stumbling block to production
under the Convention. To be sure, legislation of this sort generally should be read as subject to the enacting state's international
engagements, 2 a point Justice Blackmun made in minimizing
the impact of blocking statutes' on the Convention. Nevertheless, such statutes conceivably can re-enter through the Convention's back door, the global exception in article 12 for discovery
requests whose satisfaction would offend the requested state's
public policy or otherwise threaten its sovereignty or security.
That compliance with "otherwiseproper requests may be avoided
a discovery request, improperly certifies that the request in his or her judgment is consistent
with the Rules, not unreasonable, and "not interposed for any improper purpose."
80.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 442 comment a, reporters' note 2 (1987). According to reporters' note 2, the
Restatement provision actually "is designed... to achieve greater control of the scope of
discovery than is common in wholly domestic litigation." Id.; see also Oxman, supra note
29, at 740-44 (persuasively arguing against confusing the circumstances in which a court
asserts jurisdiction to adjudicate with those in which it acts to compel discovery). The
conventional rule in the United States has been that a court having personal jurisdiction
over a person also has the power to compel that person to submit to discovery. Insurance
Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guin~e, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); see also
In re Marc Rich & Co. A.G., 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215
(1983); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d
1300, 1309 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
81. The Restatement properly calls attention to the special importance of early court
supervision of discovery in the case of information located in a state party to the Hague
Evidence Convention. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 442 reporters' note 2 (1987).
82. France's Law Relating to the Communication of Economic, Commercial,
Industrial, Financial or Technical Documents or Information to Foreign Natural or Legal
Persons, supra note 9, for example, applies "except when international treaties or
agreements provide otherwise." Thus, requests for evidence made under the Hague
Convention ought not be subject to the French statutory prohibition on furnishing evidence
for use in a foreign legal proceeding. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 473 reporters' note 8 (1987).
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through the combined effect of a blocking statute and article 12
can readily be imagined. Still, this situation should not be
assumed. If it occurs, the forum, again by way of exception, can
conduct the kind of individual comity analysis that the Adrospatiale majority broadly favors. In appropriate circumstances, that
comity analysis will justify discovery outside the Convention.
Moreover, if foreign nationals are unlikely to produce evidence
in violation of their own state's blocking legislation, that will be
the case irrespective of whether the demand has been made
through Convention channels or through direct discovery. The
difficult questions will still remain: whether production should
be ordered notwithstanding the foreign blocking legislation,83
and whether a party that fails to comply on grounds of such
84
legislation should suffer adverse consequences in the forum.
The answers to these questions should not turn on the channels
through which the discovery request initially was made,85 and
83. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, in conformity
with prior tentative drafts, makes the threshold question whether a court or agency should
order the production of evidence located abroad depend upon a number of considerations
including:
the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or other
information requested; the degree of specificity of the request; whether the
information originated in the United States; the availability of alternative means
of securing the information; and the extent to which noncompliance with the
request would undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance
with the request would undermine important interests of the state where the
information is located.
RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW

OF THE UNITED

STATES

§ 442(1)(c), at 348.
The comments and reporters' notes offer guidance on how such analysis should be
made. For example, comment c enjoins courts and agencies neither simply to defer to
foreign state claims of intrusion upon their sovereign interests nor routinely to satisfy the
immediate interests of the prosecuting or investigating agency irrespective of "the longterm interests of the United States generally in international cooperation in law enforcement and judicial assistance ...in giving effect to formal or informal international agreements, and in orderly international relations." Id. comment c.
84. The Rdstatement generally bars a court or agency from imposing sanctions of
contempt, dismissal, or default on a party failing to comply with an order for production in
the absence of deliberate concealment or removal of information or failure to make a good
faith effort to secure permission from foreign authorities to make the information available.
RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW

OF THE UNITED

STATES

§ 442(2)(b). Section 442(2)(c), however, expressly allows a court or agency, even in such
circumstances, to make findings of fact adverse to the party failing to comply with a
production order.
85. However, for the view that in discovery subject to the Convention, the imposition
of sanctions for nonproduction would constitute a breach of the Convention, see Heck,
supra note 28, at 273-74 ("[B]ecause the Convention requires the requested court to
exercise its jurisdiction, the requesting forum court loses its power to impose sanctions
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difficulties in resolving them should not therefore deter American courts from giving Convention procedures priority over
direct discovery as an expression of international comity. In
fact, most courts rightly assume that the flexible standards
developed over the last twenty-five years for dealing with the
nonproduction of evidence located abroad are no less appropri86
ate for Convention than non-Convention cases.
In sum, while the doctrinal divergence between the Aerospadale majority and minority is not vast, it is important in substance and tone. Misgivings expressed over the majority opinion
are already apparent from Hudson v. Hermann PfauterGmbH &
Co.,87 an early reported opinion of a federal court giving effect to
the ruling. In Hudson, a West German manufacturer named as
defendant in a negligence and product liability action sought a
protective order requiring that any interrogatories propounded
by the plaintiff be served in accordance with Convention procedures rather than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33. The district court granted the order, although curiously not as a result
of the ad hoc comity inquiry that the Adrospatiale majority
emphatically held to govern whether Convention procedures
take priority over the Federal Rules. Rather, the district court
specifically relied on the minority analysis espoused by Justice
Blackmun in justifying a general rule of prior resort. In other
words, the court respected Justice Stevens' formal insistence that
the choice between Convention and non-Convention procedures
be made on a case-by-case basis,8 8 but it exercised that choice by
pointedly using Justice Blackmun's framework of analysis89_
one that not only balances the competing interests of the United
States and the foreign state but takes specific account of "the
mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly functioning international legal regime." 90
regarding the same factual circumstances.... Rather, [it] . .. would have to seek the
assistance of its own government under Article 36 of the Convention.").

86. See, eg., Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance pour le Commerce Ext6rieur v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 24-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). For the view that when
execution of a letter of request is refused by a foreign state, the requesting court is free
under the Convention to issue appropriate orders and draw appropriate inferences, see
REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 473
reporters' note 6.
87. 117 F.R.D. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
88. Id. at 36.
89. The district court characterized Justice Blackmun's approach as "persuasive."
Id. at 37.
90. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S.
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Not surprisingly, the outcome was a requirement that the
plaintiff use Convention procedures first. 91 The Hudson court's
preference for the views of the Adrospatiale minority is not lessened because it presented its result as an individual application
of comity principles rather than as the product of a general prior
resort rule. In fact, its ostensible ad hoc analysis strongly resembles a thinly disguised resurrection of Justice Blackmun's
generic preference for such a rule. In the first place, the court
found the foreign interests at hand to be "particularly compelling" 92 for no more specific reason than that West Germany is a
civil-law country (as well as a Hague Convention party) and
therefore "necessarily" apt to find common-law discovery
devices offensive to "sovereign integrity. ' 93 As for the United
States, the court conceded that it had an interest in facilitating
the just resolution of disputes and in ensuring that foreigners
who do business here are answerable in American courts. However, the court effectively blunted the force of this argument by
requiring any party invoking national interests in order to
bypass the Convention to demonstrate that use of the Convention actually would frustrate those interests. 94 Moreover, the
court's reasons for doubting the alleged shortcomings of the
Convention seem practically universal in application and hardly
unique to the case at hand. First, the court found that the Convention's inconvenience and expense have been exaggerated, will
probably diminish over time, and do not outweigh the Convention's virtues. Second, it observed that American courts have
sufficient inherent authority to control discovery so as to prevent
Ct. 2542, 2562 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Hudson court identified the major difference of Justice Blackmun's approach from the
usual comity analysis as its lesser emphasis on the interests of the individual litigants and
its correspondingly greater emphasis on national interests. Hudson, 117 F.R.D. at 37.

Another difference seems to be Justice Blackmun's separate and important weighting of
these "mutual interests . . . in a smoothly functioning international legal regime."
Adrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2562. The district court actually described Justice Blackmun's
tripartite analysis as "preferred" over the Restatement-style comity analysis adopted by the
Airospatiale majority, precisely because the weight to be given to the Convention in any

given case properly "transcend[s] the interests of the individual litigants." Hudson, 117
F.R.D. at 37.
91. The court reached this result notwithstanding its admission that Convention
procedures "appear to be more cumbersome" than the Federal Rules. Hudson, 117 F.R.D.
at 35.

92. Id at 37.
93. Id. at 37-38 (quoting extensively Justice Blackmun's discussion of the affront of

direct discovery to civil-law notions of judicial sovereignty).
94. Id at 38-39.
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either party from securing an unfair advantage over the other.95
Given the court's assessment of the relative national interests, its
third consideration, the mutual interest of all nations in a
smoothly functioning international legal regime, could point in
only one direction.9 6 In sum, the court's ostensible ad hoc

inquiry represents a powerful repudiation of Justice Stevens'
opinion in Adrospatiale in favor of Justice Blackmun's.
A comity-driven approach to the Convention should not be
mistaken for indulgence toward foreign litigants who resist
extraterritorial discovery in American courts. As I have argued,
and as the latest Restatement emphasizes, 97 there is no inconsistency in according priority to Convention procedures and at the
same time taking a dim view of foreign-country blocking legislation. Such statutes simply should not constitute an automatic
bar to discovery under the Federal Rules, at least as concerns
foreign interests that have brought themselves, by their own conduct, within the jurisdiction of American courts. These statutes
justify at most a balancing of competing interests, a balance that
more often than not ends up favoring foreign discovery. Similarly, I maintain, as does the Restatement,98 that parties who
refuse discovery in reliance on blocking legislation do not necessarily deserve to avoid all of the adverse effects that ordinarily
flow from noncompliance with a court's production order.
However, they generally should escape the harshest of those
effects, such as contempt, dismissal, or default, if they have
made good-faith efforts to comply. The fact remains that American courts would actually be aided in making proper claims for
cooperation from those in control of evidence abroad if the
courts adopted a more gracious, indeed more honest, reception
of the Convention than the Supreme Court has accorded it.
Both by its substance and its rhetoric, the Adrospatiale ruling
unfortunately misses an important opportunity to promote the
spirit of accommodation essential to the internationalization of
law and legal practice.
95. In effect, the court would require parties first to see how useful Convention
procedures are in any given case before assuming the superiority of the Federal Rules. Id.
96. "Use of Hague Convention procedures in lieu of the Federal Rules when
discovery is sought in a civil law country like West Germany will in nearly every instance
promote 'the development of an ordered international system.'" IaM at 40 (citing
Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2567 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.)).
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 442 reporters' note 1 (1987).
98. Id reporters' note 5.

